A search of the Collected Works CD revealed no instances of "Ayn", "Rand", or "objectivism".

Wiki: "Atlas Shrugged is often seen as Rand's most extensive statement of Objectivism in any of her works of fiction.".

It was not published until after Korzybski's death, and a little research shows that her philosophy mostly post-dated Korzybski.

Kristopher,

Do not forget that so-called "Aristotelian" logic is the core and cornerstone - the foundation - upon which so-called "non-Aristotelian" logic is built. The relation is not one of "either-or" but one of subset inclusion. Non-Aristotelian logic extends logic as it has evolved since the days of Aristotle.

Do not let yourself get "caught up" in the "anti-Aristotialn" rhetoric being spread by those with math and logic phobia who don't know the difference. For a specific illustration read how Popper's falsification principle use good ol' modus tolens.

Notice that we in general semantics avoid the use of the word "is" (at least some of the time"), but we say "what is going on", recognizing that we "project" structure. Objectivism says "it is what it is". Both of these ways of saying something aren't much different from the French "je ne se qua". All "admit" that we cannot know directly. "what 'is' 'really' 'out there'".

You should not be dissappointed in the use of so-called "Aristotelian" logic; you should only be "dissappointed" is inappropriate use of Aristotelian logic and in the use of fallacious reasoning (which is not Aristotelian logic.

Thomas wrote "At first glance it looks promising but I was unable to get anyone to consider that language can effect how we perceive the world, for example, because, to them, things exist independent of us or our language, etc."

Not just to them. This is a statement of the common metaphysics accepted by the vast majority of people, and most general semanticists as well, judging from a lot of comments on this and other boards. It's quite different from "knowledge" of "what is going on" or "what it is". As far as I understand it, "general semantics" is "silent" with respect to what "is"; general semantics speaks only to what or how we can "know". Saying what "is" "is" strictly a matter of belief from the general semantics perspective. It does not matter whether you say it with assertions as the objectivists do, or if you qualify it with "belief", the main clause is still metaphysical.

X "is" Y; or "I believe" X "is" Y, but formal science would say we "model" X as Y (and what both "X" and "Y" refer to are projections of the structures "defined" in "X" and "Y").